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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CAROL HOFFMAN,
Plaintiff and
Appellant,
vs.

Case No. 18184

LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF
NORTH AM.ERICA,
Defendant and
Respondent.
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action for insurance proceeds under an accidental death insurance policy covering Louis Hoffman.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case was tried to the Honorable Dean E. Condor who
found that the death of Louis Hoffman was not accidental.
Judgment was entered for defendant.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent Life Insurance Company of North America requests that this Court affirm the Findings, Conclusions and
Judgment of the Trial Court.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant Carol Hoffman is the owner of a group accidental death insurance policy provided through an employment
program covering my husband Louis Hoffman ("Louis").

As

defined in the policy, an accidental death is a death·"resulting directly and independently of all other causes from
bodily injuries caused by accident."

(Plaintiff's Ex. 2, R.

182)

During the evening of February 7, 1979, Carol told Louis
that she had spoken with an attorney about a divorce.
117)

(R.

Carol and Louis then discussed a property division dur-

ing which Louis drank an alcoholic beverage.
190, 193, 194)

(R. 178, 189,

Louis then went to his son's bedroom and

obtained a .357 magnum revolver which he fired outside the
home to demonstrate that it was loaded.

(R. 179, 180, 234)

Louis expressly and impliedly threatened Carol's life.
184-188)

(R.

He also forcibly disabled the telephone when Carol

was talking to the "911" operator requesting police assistance.

Carol fled to a neighbor's home where she called the

Salt Lake Police Department for help.

(R. 179, 180)

(Find-

ings, Nos. 6, 7 and 8)
After Carol fled, Louis went to his mother's house where
he telephoned his home and spoke with his adult daughter,
Karee.

He convinced her that he was at the United Airlines
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desk at the airport and that she should come immediately to
the airport to meet him.

(R. 187-189, 232-234)

Instead of meeting his daughter at the airport, Louis
drove back to his home where he was spotted by Officer Lorraine Killpack who was then investigating the incident.
Officer Killpack had correctly deduced that the "airport"
call was a ruse to separate Karee from her mother.
encouraged Carol and Karee to go to a safe place.
207)

She
(R. 206,

Officer Killpack was assisted by Officers Frank

Hatton-Ward and Gil Salazar, each driving in a separate
patrol car.

(R. 203)

The officers tried to stop and arrest Louis by verbal
commands over their loudspeakers and with flashing lights and
sirens.
mands.

Louis failed and refused to respond to their comAfter a low-speed chase, Louis again drove to his

home and pulled into the driveway where he was confronted by
the three officers.

(R. 135-138, 153-158, 208-210)

Officer

Hatton-Ward, standing at the open passenger-side window of
Louis' vehicle with Officer Salazar standing to his immediate
right, ordered Louis to put his gun down and freeze.

Louis

failed and refused to comply with these lawful commands.
160-165)

(R.

Instead he attempted to leave the vehicle in a way

which Officers Hatton-Ward and Salazar believed was life
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threatening.

They both shot and killed Louis.

149-151, 164-167)

(R. 143, 144,

(Findings, Nos. 9-11, 13-16)

In a separate case before the Third Judicial District
Court for Salt Lake County, a wrongful death action against
Salt Lake City Corporation was brought for Louis' death.

In

that case the court ruled that as a matter of law the off icers had the duty and right to arrest Louis under the existing circumstances.

The jury held the offiers' conduct was

reasonable and returned a defense verdict.

This ruling and

verdict were not appealed and the time for appeal has expired.

(Findings, No. 12)

Carol Hoffman brought this action claiming that Louis
suffered an accidental death.

Life Insurance Company of

North America denied coverage upon the ground that Louis'
death was not accidental and therefore not within the insuring clause of the policy.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
LOUIS' DEATH WAS NOT ACCIDENTAL SINCE IT
WAS THE NATURAL AND PROBABLE CONSEQUENCE OF
HIS LIFE-THREATENING ACTIONS.
The primary issue is whether Louis' death was accidental.

It would be accidental if it resulted "directly and

independently of all other causes from bodily injuries caused
by accident."
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In reviewing claims for accidental death benefits, this
Court has uniformly held that an accidental death is one
which is reasonably unforeseeable, a death which is not the
natural and probable consequence of the insured's actions.
A comprehensive explanation of this rule is found· in
Handley v. Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, 106
Utah 184, 147 P.2d 319 (1944).

There this Court was asked to

determine whether a death following surgery was accidental
under an insurance policy.

In reviewing its longstanding

definition of accidental death, the court indicated that the
word "accidental" should be viewed in the relation of causes
to their effects.

Where a death is by actual design or the

natural and probable consequence of the insured's actions, it
is not accidental:
An effect which is the natural and probable consequence of an act or course of action is not an accident, nor is it produced by accidental means.
It is
either the result of actual design, or it falls under
the maxim that every man must be held to intend the
natural and probable consequence of his deeds. 147
P.2d at 322.
This reasonable unforeseeability rule was recently applied in Elton v. Bankers Life and Casualty Company, 30 Utah
2d 213, 516 P.2d 165 (1973).

There it was claimed that the

insured's death from a heart attack was accidental.

In again

applying the reasonable unforeseeability rule, this Court
held:
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"[A]ll of the definitions" of accident "include the
idea that the means as well as the result must be
unforeseen, involuntary, unexpected and unusual; that
it must be a happening by chance." [Emphasis by the
Court] 516 P.2d at 173.
Under Utah's long standing reasonable unforeseeability
rule, appellant had the burden of proving that Louis'·death
was not the natural and probable consequence of his actions.
Based upon the evidence, the trial court found that the contrary was true, that Louis' death was the natural and probable consequence of his actions.

As this Court has recently

reaffirmed, the standard for appellate review is whether the
trial court's "findings are clearly against the weight of the
evidence."
1982).

Garcia v. Schwendimar, No. 17559 (Utah, April 1,

Thus, unless appellant shows that this finding was

clearly erroneous, it must stand.
Louis threatened his wife while brandishing a gun.

Not

only did he fire the gun, but he also forcibly disabled the
telephone.

He lied to his daughter both as to where he was

and where he would meet her.

When commanded by police offi-

cers to surrender, he refused and led them on a low-speed
chase.

When he finally stopped, he was commanded by the

officers to drop his gun, which he refused to do.

As ob-

served by Officer Salazar, Louis pointed the gun at a fellow
officer whereupon Salazar fired.

As observed by Officer Hat-
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ton-Ward, Louis moved in such a way that the officer could no
longer see the gun.

Believing that the gun was aimed where

another officer was positioned, he shot.
165-169).

(R. 143, 144,

Based upon these uncontested facts, Louis' death

was the natural and probable consequence of his actions.

It

was not an accidental death.
Appellant argues that Sanders v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, 104 Utah 75, 138 P.2d 239 (1943), compels the
conclusion that Louis' death was accidental.

In Sanders a

15-year-old boy had escaped from an Industrial School.
free, he burglarized a store and stole a car.

While

While in the

stolen automobile he and his 14-year-old companion, who was
driving, were spotted by the Sheriff.

While fleeing from the

Sheriff, their car crashed resulting in their deaths.

The

court applied the reasonable unforeseeability rule noted in
Handley and held that it could not be said that the boy's
death was the natural and probable consequence of his being a
.
passenger in
a spee d'ing car. 1

1

In Sanders the court also considered and rejected the
insurance company's claim that as a matter of public
policy recovery should not be allowed since the boy was
violating the law at the time of his death. Respondent
has not and does not advocate this theory.
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The similarity between Sanders and the present case is
two-fold.

First, both cases involve an insured who was vio-

lating the law.

However, this is not determinative of whe-

ther the death was accidental.

Second, in both cases the

standard applied was whether the death was the natural and
probable consequence of the insured's actions.

In Sanders

the court found that death was not the natural and probable
consequence of speeding.

This is a well-recognized observa-

tion of many motorists.

Although the risk or probability of

an accident or collision probably increases when the speed
limit is exceeded, there is not a high correlation of such
effect.

Thousands of motorists exceed the speed limit each

day and none expect to be hurt or killed as a result.

Arming

oneself, threatening death or serious injury to another, refusing to respond to a peace officer's lawful commands and
refusing to disarm on command is not a parallel action to
exceeding a posted limit.

The reasonably foreseeable conse-

quences are vastly different.

Therefore, the trial court

found and the evidence supports a finding that Louis' death
was the natural and probable consequence of his life threatening actions.
As stated in the annotation relied upon by appellant,
recovery may be had under an accidental death policy even
though the death occurred while violating the law only if it
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is determined "that the circumstances were such that the insured could not reasonably have foreseen or expected the injury or death."

43 A.L.R. 3d 1120 at 1124.

Since Louis' death was the natural and probable consequence of his actions, it was not accidental.
POINT II
THAT THE POLICE OFFICERS INTENDED TO SHOOT
LOUIS WHEN HE THREATENED THE LIVES OF
OTHERS DOES NOT ESTABLISH AN ACCIDENTAL
DEATH.
Appellant suggests that when "death [is] produced by the
intentional conduct of those other than the insured," every
jurisdiction considering the question has found such a death
to be accidental.

Appellant's Brief, p. 8.

To the contrary,

what the cases hold is that death caused by the intentional
conduct of a third person does not preclude the possiblity
that the death may have been accidental.

As stated in the

annotation relied upon by appellant, where a third person
inflicts the injury or death, the question whether the death
is accidental generally turns "on a determination of whether
the insured, by his actions, should have reasonably expected
the violent outcome."

49 A.L.R. 3d 673 at 678.

This is but

a restatement of the Utah rule requiring that the death not
be the natural and probable consequence of the insured's
actions.
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POINT III
APPELLANT'S SUGGESTION THAT THE DEFINITION
OF ACCIDENTAL DEATH BE REWRITTEN TO EXCLUDE
ANY REFERENCE TO FORESEEABILITY IS CONTRARY
TO THE LAW AND WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION.
Appellant takes the position that this Court's settled
definition of accidental death should be rewritten to exclude
any reference to foreseeability.

It is suggested that the

logic of Sanders requires this, even though the outcome in
Sanders hinged on a finding based upon unexpected result.
This revision of the law would require the repudiation of the
"natural and probable consequence" definition of Handley,
Sanders, Elton, and numerous other Utah cases.
rationale for such action is three-fold.

Appellant's

First, it is

claimed that the modern legal trend is to abandon this rule.
Second, that the word "accidental" in insurance contracts is
ambiguous and therefore should be construed against the insured.

Third, foreseeability is a negligence doctrine which

should not be mixed with insurance contract law.

(Appel-

lant's Brief pp. 10-12.)
With regard to the "modern legal trend" argument, it can
hardly be said that a few courts adopting appellant's view in
the last twenty years establishes a trend.

All that it

demonstrates is that a minority rule exists which is contrary
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to the well-founded and long-established rule of this Court
and, indeed the vast majority of jurisdictions.
Claiming ambiguity and thus challenging the reasonable
unforeseeability requirement places the insurer in a position
uncontemplated by the parties.

Without the concept of rea-

sonable unforeseeability, "accident" has no meaning.
dent" insurance would be effectively eliminated.

"Acci-

Under this

approach, any death would be covered unless the precise cause
of death were expressly excluded in the insurance policy.
This would transform an accident policy into a life insurance
policy, a result this Court rejected in Elton:
The common acceptance of the term "accident" fortified, as it is, by a small premium in "accident" as
opposed to "health and accident" policies and "life
insurance" policies would seem to be about the only
protection a commercial insurance company has against
any industrial, lexicological or judicial alchemy
that otherwise virtually would transmute a simple
accident policy into a health policy or a life insurance policy. 516 P.2d at 172.
In any event, the term "accident" is not ambiguous.

As

observed in Elton, "all of the definitions" of accident inelude the idea of unforeseeability, a "happening by chance."
516 P.2d at 173.

And, as stated in Handley, supra:

This court has definitely gone on record as construing the provision under discussion and equiva~ent
provisions as reaching cases where the death or disablement is the unexpected result • • • • 147 P.2d at
322.
The ambiguity argument and its untenable results have long
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since been disposed of in Utah and do not now justify a
departure from precedent.
As to the argument that since foreseeability is included
in negligence law it therefore cannot be applied in contract
law, it too is faulty.

The concept of foreseeability·cannot

be limited to negligence law on a theory that foreseeability
is an exclusive commodity that can only be used once in the
law.

The definition of accident includes the concept of

foreseeability and should be so applied.

Furthermore, if the

foreseeability concept is limited to negligence law, then the
application of this concept to lost profits, strict product
liability, and other areas of the law is improper as well.
Furthermore, appellant's averred concern with confusion
based upon concepts of contributory negligence and comparative fault are unjustified.

The rule requires that the inci-

dent be examined from the position of the insured, that is
whether the death is the natural and probable consequence of
his actions.

No reference is made in that definition to the

intent or fault of others.

Furthermore, there was no contri-

butory negligence or comparative fault in this matter since,
in a separate case, the police officers were not found to be
negligent.
Appellant's attempts to reverse the long-standing Utah
rule requiring reasonable unforeseeability in an accidental
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death case is improper and should be rejected.
POINT IV
INSANITY DOES NOT CONVERT A NON-ACCIDENTAL
DEATH INTO AN ACCIDENTAL DEATH.
A.
LOUIS' CLAIMED MENTAL ILLNESS DID NOT PREVENT HIM
FROM UNDERSTANDING THE MORAL CHARACTER, GENERAL NATURE AND
CONSEQUENCES OF HIS LIFE THREATENING ACTIONS.
Appellant argues that Louis had a mental disease at the
time he confronted the police officers which "deprived him of
the ability to make rational decisions about the consequences
of his actions or to control his behavior in a light of probable consequences of such conduct."
p. 13.)

(Appellant's Brief

Appellant contends that this claimed mental illness

converts what would otherwise be a non-accidental death into
an accidental death.
The only testimony involving mental illness was that of
Dr. Robert Mohr.

(R. 112-132)

was a high paranoid.

Dr. Mohr testified that Louis

He testified that by definition, a high

paranoid is delusional in one area, but not others.

Based

upon his interviews with Louis and his prior acquaintance
·with him in waterfowl hunting, he concluded that Louis was
familiar with the dangers and uses of firearms and that this
knowledge would not have been clouded or deluded by his high
paranoia.

(R. 117-119)

In view of this evidence, the trial

court understandably made no finding that Louis had a
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mental illness which rendered him unable to understand the
moral character, general nature and consequences of his
actions in refusing to surrender his gun, in taking lifethreatening actions with it when confronted by armed police
officers or in failing to understand the danger posed by the
officers' guns.
As noted earlier, any reversal on this point, assuming
the law is as applicant claims, requires a showing that the
trial court's decision on the issue of the mental illness of
Louis was clearly erroneous.

Although appellant did not

indicate in her argument what evidence she was relying upon
to show that the trial court's decision was clearly erroneous, it is presumed that reference is being made to Dr.
Mohr's opinion that Louis' high paranoia would have affected
his emotional state during the events leading to his death.
(R. 115-117)

At no time was Dr. Mohr asked nor did he testi-

fy that when commanded to surrender his weapon, Louis would
not have been able to understand the moral character, general
nature and consequences of his actions.

Nor did he indicate

that Louis' actions would be the insane impulse of a disordered mind.

To the contrary, Dr. Mohr testified that with

regard to firearms and their dangers, Louis would not have
been delusional.

(R. 117-119)
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Not only does the evidence fail to show that the trial
court was clearly erroneous in not finding that the mental
illness claimed by appellant was not such as to make his
actions the insane impulse of a disordered mind, but the
evidence establishes that such was not the case.
B.
SINCE EVERY PERSON IS HELD TO INTEND THE NATURAL AND
PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR ACTIONS, MENTAL ILLNESS DOES
NOT HAVE ANY BEARING ON WHETHER AN ACCIDENT HAS OCCURRED.

Even assuming, for argument, that Louis was mentally ill
and that his mental illness precluded him from recognizing
the moral character, general nature and consequences of his
life threatening actions, this does not make his death accidental.

As indicated earlier, the long-standing Utah rule

requires that the death not be the natural and probable consequence of the insured's actions.

This definition places

the emphasis on the actions of the insured, not his frame of
mind.

It is for this reason that this Court in Handley

stated that a natural and probable consequence is either the
"result of actual design, or falls under the maxim that every
man must be held to intend the natural and probable consequences of his deeds."
fold.

Put another way, the test is two-

First, would a reasonable person standing in the place

of the decedent have foreseen the result.
was not accidental.

If so, the death

In addition, if an insured actually in-
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tended the result or had a physical ailment which made the
result foreseeable, even though it would not have been a
natural and probable consequence for an average or reasonable
person, then the death would not have been accidental.
This latter point was noted in Kellogg v. California
Western States Life Insurance Co., 201 P.2d 949 (Utah 1949).
There the insured died from post-operative shock.
the operation everything appeared normal.

Prior to

However, when the

incision was made, seventeen critical adhesions were found
that required considerable time and great care.

The discov-

ery of the adhesions made the insured a poor surgical risk.
The trial court found that this death was not accidental.

In

affirming, this Court relied on the rule in Handley and held
that although under the first part of the Handley test the
death would be accidental, under the second part of the test
there were special conditions which made the insured's death
expected.

The court did not abandon the maxim that every man

must be held to intend the natural and probable consequence
of his deeds.

The court simply held that the insured's con-

dition made what would ordinarily have been an accidental
death into a non-accidental death.

This is the converse to

what appellant now seeks.
As discussed earlier, this concept of accidental death
being a death not the natural and probable consequence of the
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insured's actions is the distinguishing feature between an
accident policy and a life or health policy.

If, as appel-

lant argues, a mental illness shifts the emphasis from a
focus on actions to mental capacity, the definition would be
changed.

The change would be such that a person with·a men-

tal illness would have his accidental death insurance policy
converted to a life insurance policy for death resulting from
his actions.

For the same small premium, he would have far

more extensive coverage than a sane individual.

As indicated

in Elton, supra, the term accident should not be transmuted
by "judicial alchemy" so that an accident policy becomes a
life insurance policy.
Appellant discusses two cases in support of her theory.
In the first, Kobylakiewicz v. Prudental Insurance Company of
North America, 180 A. 491 (N.J. 1935), the insured had been
confined to a state hospital for the insane.

Within a short

time after his release, he became very violent and threatened
his family.

When the police attempted to arrest him, the

insured rushed them with a pick axe acting like a "wildman."
In the attempt to arrest him, he was shot and killed.

The

court there found that the insured's death was accidental.
However, the basis for that decision was not an exception to
the rule discussed in Handley.

The court there noted that in

New Jersey an accident is an event that takes place without
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the insured's foresight or expectation.

In other words, a

subjective test was used rather than the objective test followed in Handley and the other Utah cases.

Under such a

test, the insured's mental capacity would be relevant.

Since

this is not the rule in Utah, the case is irrelevant. The second case cited by the appellant is Continental
Casualty Company v. Maguire, 471 P.2d 636 (Colo. App. 1970).
There the insured had been hospitalized for mental illness
four times in the ten years preceding his injury.
last release, he threatened his wife with a gun.

After his
When the

police attempted to pursuade him to surrender, he shot and
inflicted superficial wounds on an officer.

The police re-

sponded by firing ten tear gas canisters into his home, one
of which exploded in his face and blinded him.

The court

found the injuries to be accidental on three grounds.

First,

the insured was not engaged in aggressive acts at the time
the canister exploded in his eyes.

Second, it was never

intended that the teargas cansiter should injure him.

Third,

the court found that he was insane at the time and therefore
did not have the ability to recognize the moral character,
general nature and consequences of his actions.
ing, the court relied on Kobylakiewicz.

In so find-

Although appellant

suggests that Colorado follows the Utah rule, such is not the
case.

As noted in Reed v. United States Fidelity and Guaran-
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ty Company, 491 P.2d 1377 (Colo. 1971), Colorado follows a
test in which an event is accidental if it is not the natural
or probable consequence of the means which produced it or
which the actor did not intend to produce.

Although the

first part of the Colorado test is similar to the Utah test,
the second part, on which the court relied, is contrary to
the Utah rule.

It is the same subjective standard applied in

Kobylakiewicz.

This case is also irrelevant.

Where courts have adopted the same rule which has been
applied in Utah, the courts have held that the mental state
of the insured is irrelevant in determining whether an accident has occurred.

This was pointed out in Carlyle v. Equity

Benefit Life Insurance Company, 551 P.2d 663 (Ct. App. Okla.
1976).

There the insured was killed while committing an

armed robbery.
accidental.

The trial court held that his death was not

In affirming this decision, the appellate court

reviewed the various jurisdictions on this issue.

The court

noted that a minority of jurisdictions apply a subjective
test which make the mental state of the insured relevant.
The court went on to note and accept the majority position
requiring the objective standard of reasonable unforeseeability:
The majority of courts, on the other hand, tend to
pay less attention to the assumed mental state of the
insured and evaluate the facts and circumstances from
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the viewpoint of a reasonable person. The conclusion
usually reached is that death is just too likely, too
foreseeable, too natural a consequence of a serious
law violation to justify the contention that it was
the result of an accident. 551 P.2d at 666.
The Utah rule requiring the application of an objective
test is not altered by any finding that the insured was not
capable of understanding the moral character, general nature
and consequences of his actions.
CONCLUSION
Louis Hoffman's death was the natural and probable consequence of his refusal to surrender his gun and his lifethreatening actions with the gun.

It was not accidental.

The Judgment of the Trial Court should be affirmed.
Dated this

day of May, 1982.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

By
H. James Clegg

By
Henry K. Chai II
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